



LIGHT AT THE END OF THE PIPELINE?:  CHOOSING A  
FORUM FOR SUSPECTED TERRORISTS 
Despite the fact that six years have passed since 9/11, the Penta-
gon’s recent decision to try six Guantanamo detainees for capital 
crimes such as “terrorism and support of terrorism” made national 
headlines.  William Glaberson, “U.S. Charges 6 With Key Roles in 
9/11 Attacks,” N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2008, at A1.  In this Debate, Profes-
sors Amos N. Guiora, of the University of Utah, and John T. Parry, of 
Lewis & Clark Law School, attempt to settle the question of what sort 
of forum is most appropriate to try the thousands of individuals in 
U.S. custody who are suspected of terrorism. 
Professor Guiora considers three forum options:  treaty-based in-
ternational terror courts, traditional Article III courts, and a “hybrid” 
option he calls domestic terror courts.  Ultimately, Professor Guiora 
argues in favor of domestic terror courts, which he describes as being 
able to “balance[] the legitimate rights of the individual with the 
equally legitimate national security rights of the state.”  He considers 
this option to be the most practical and expedient policy solution, ne-
cessitated by an untenable tension between the understanding “that 
some of the detainees present a genuine threat to American national 
security,” and an awareness “that indefinite detention violates consti-
tutional principles and fundamental concepts of morality.” 
Professor Parry agrees that current U.S. policy toward detainees 
has been “misguided,” but does not believe that innovations of the 
sort proposed by Professor Guiora are necessary.  Rather, he suggests 
“that policymakers should choose Article III courts rather than hybrid 
courts for trials of suspected terrorists, with military courts as a fall-
back option.”  Professor Parry points to research that shows that “the 
federal government is often able to prosecute suspected terrorists in 
federal court,” and therefore considers alternative proposals to Article 
III courts to be “solution[s] in search of a problem.”  Professor Parry 
realizes that “trial in federal court will not be possible for every sus-
pected terrorist,” and concludes that, “[f]or people who pose a risk 
but whose conduct may not violate federal criminal law, prolonged 
preventive detention is the best choice.” 
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OPENING STATEMENT 




Six years after 9/11, and more than a year and a half after Hamdan 
v. Rumsfeld and the Military Commissions Act (MCA) one of the criti-
cal questions of the post-9/11 world has still gone unanswered:  where 
do we try terrorists?  More accurately, where do we try the 25,000 indi-
viduals held worldwide either by the United States—or on behalf of 
the United States —who are suspected of terrorism?  I deliberately itali-
cize the word “suspected” because it is important to recall that the in-
dividual in question is no more than that—a suspect.  He or she may 
be the “worst of the worst” (per then-Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld’s 
outrageous description of all individuals held at Guantanamo Bay), or 
he or she might be like the hundreds of detainees released from 
Guantanamo Bay who the United States had no reason to detain in 
the first place. 
The question Professor Parry and I are addressing—where to try 
suspected terrorists—encompasses a range of complex definitional 
problems.  For example, how do we define the individual detainee?  
Who is he?  What has he done?  Why did we detain him?  What are his 
rights?  The following questions are also pertinent:  when may an indi-
vidual be detained?  Under what conditions (and how) may he be in-
terrogated?  What evidence may be introduced into a court of law and 
by what process?  May he know the charges against him (and when)?  
And, if convicted, where may he appeal? 
Let’s begin with the basics:  The individual presently or in the fu-
ture is, I suggest, not a criminal, nor is he a prisoner of war (POW), 
but he is something.  That something has defied definition to date.  Be-
cause this individual’s status defies definition, articulating a rights-
based regime for that individual has frustrated the Bush administra-
tion’s post-9/11 efforts.  At the same time, articulating a rights-based 
regime has defined the Bush administration’s efforts.  If the individual 
is neither a criminal nor a POW, what is he?  Various terms have been 
bandied about including enemy combatant, illegal combatant, illegal 
belligerent, and enemy belligerent.  None has led to the establishment 
of a workable rights-based regime.  To get there, the starting point 
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must be that all individuals have rights, and all individuals must be de-
fined. 
In numerous decisions (Rasul v. Bush, Rumsfeld v. Padilla, Hamdan 
v. Rumsfeld, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld), the U.S. Supreme Court has failed to 
articulate what legal term of art is appropriate for the detainees and 
what their rights are.  Congress has completely failed in its constitu-
tionally granted oversight powers.  Checks and balances and separa-
tion of powers have largely fallen by the wayside.  The result is an 
amorphous and vague legal regime.  The bottom line is a lack of a bot-
tom line. 
Into that vacuum, I present the following proposal:  the post-9/11 
detainees are a “hybrid”—neither POW nor criminal.  What does that 
mean?  A “hybrid” suggests taking a bit from here and a bit from there 
in an effort to articulate a workable model.  This model would enable 
a fair trial for those detained post-9/11; it would stand as a dramatic 
improvement over the status quo since, to date, no fair process has 
been developed by the Bush administration.  
Let us examine the efforts to date:  The military commissions, 
whether in their original construction or their revamped construction  
after Hamdan and the Military Commissions Act, have not proven suc-
cessful.  Thus far, only one detainee has been convicted.  Recently the 
Legal Advisor to the Convening Authority for the Office of Military 
Commissions, Brigadier General Thomas W. Hartmann, testified be-
fore Congress that evidence obtained from a detainee subjected to wa-
terboarding could be admitted—this, despite universal condemnation 
of waterboarding as torture.  These facts speak resoundingly to the 
military commission’s inadequate and ineffective safeguards for sus-
pected terrorists.  It is clear that, even in their revamped format, these 
efforts are, in a word, nonstarters. 
On the other hand, as the United States is either directly or indi-
rectly responsible for the detainees it holds, the country must develop 
a workable judicial process quickly.  Given that some of the detainees 
present a genuine threat to American national security and that in-
definite detention violates constitutional principles and fundamental 
concepts of morality, this is a must. 
There are, I suggest, three workable legal-judicial models for the 
“post-9/11 detainees” (Guantanamo Bay is no longer a workable 
model): 
1) Treaty-based international terror court; 
2) Traditional Article III courts; 
3) Domestic terror courts. 
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I. TREATY-BASED INTERNATIONAL TERROR COURT 
While attractive-sounding in light of globalization trends, the con-
cept of a treaty-based international terror court is not the answer to 
our problem.  The reason is simple:  in order to establish such a court, 
the nations of the world (at least those who would be party to such an 
institution) would need to agree upon a definition of the term “terror-
ism.”  As has been documented elsewhere, agreeing upon a definition 
of terrorism eludes the FBI and the State and Defense Departments.  
The United Nation’s role post-9/11 has been at best—speaking po-
litely—extraordinarily limited as member nations similarly cannot 
agree upon a definition of terrorism. 
Supposing that this enormous stumbling block could be over-
come, member nations would then need to address a laundry list of 
issues.  To mention a few:  imposition of the death penalty, jurisdic-
tion over domestic terrorism (of another nation), cooperation regard-
ing intelligence gathering and sharing, rules of evidence, and prison 
conditions.  While this is only a partial list, the point is clear:  the es-
tablishment of a treaty-based international terror court, though per-
haps worthwhile, will not be an immediate development.  In the 
meantime, there are detainees awaiting trial. 
II. ARTICLE III COURTS 
While I dare not put words in Professor Parry’s mouth, my as-
sumption is that he will articulate in a most convincing manner why 
Article III courts are the favored course.  As the best offense is a good 
defense, bringing post-9/11 detainees to a traditional criminal trial is, 
to be blunt, a fantasy. 
The trial of Zacarias Moussaoui—held out by some as an example 
justifying the effectiveness of Article III courts for terrorists—
highlights the many problems attendant with trying suspected terror-
ists in an Article III court.  Moussaoui, often referred to as “the 20th 
hijacker,” was suspected of training with al-Qaeda in preparation for 
the 9/11 attacks and later pled guilty to six counts of conspiracy.  
While initially denying involvement, he ultimately confessed that he 
was supposed to fly a fifth plane into the White House.  Grandstand-
ing throughout the process, Moussaoui largely turned the trial into a 
farce.  The court—particularly when Moussaoui chose to represent 
himself—was largely unequipped to respond to or prevent his antics, 
which significantly affected public perception of the judicial process. 
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Furthermore, Moussaoui’s trial raised Sixth Amendment compul-
sory due process concerns.  See Hon. Shira A. Scheindlin & Matthew L. 
Schwartz, With all Due Deference:  Judicial Responsibility in a Time of Crisis, 
32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 795 (2004).  Preparing his defense, Moussaoui 
asked for “access to alleged terrorist ringleader Ramzi bin al-Shibh,” 
id. at 835,
 
who at the time was in federal custody, because Moussaoui 
believed bin al-Shibh could provide exculpatory evidence.  The gov-
ernment, however, argued that giving Moussaoui such access would 
compromise national security.  Id.  The court “agreed with Moussaoui, 
holding that the Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process is not 
outweighed by claims that the government’s intelligence-gathering ef-
forts would be undermined.”  Id. at 835-36.  “Moussaoui would be 
given access to, and could present to the jury, a compilation of sum-
maries of reports of bin Al-Shibh’s statements taken by the govern-
ment.”  Id. at 837.  The court’s decision highlights the ongoing con-
flicts between a suspected terrorist defendant’s rights and the 
government’s security concerns. 
The fundamental deficiencies with using Article III courts in a ter-
rorist context are inherent.  First, much of the evidence available 
against suspected terrorists is predicated on intelligence information.  
Article III courts, however, must abide by certain constitutional rights, 
including the Sixth Amendment right to confront one’s accuser.  This 
right places an explicit limitation on the prosecution.  It deprives the 
prosecutor of the ability to go forth with all available (and confiden-
tial) intelligence information, since the defendant would not be able 
to confront it. 
In addition, a defendant in an Article III court has a right to trial 
by a “jury of his peers.” See Carter v. Jury Comm’n, 396 U.S. 320, 330 
(1970) (defining “peers” as “‘his neighbors, fellows, associates, [and] 
persons having the same legal status in society as that which he holds’” 
(quoting Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1879)).  Put sim-
ply, if Osama bin Laden were detained today and brought before a 
court of law, would it be possible to find a “jury of his peers”?  Would 
it be possible to find 12 members of the community willing to sit in 
judgment of the most wanted terrorist on the planet? 
While an instinctual, reflexive, revenge-based answer is yes, closer 
scrutiny suggests that fears of retribution from bin Laden supporters 
would drive the overwhelming majority of potential jurors literally 
“underground.”  Two principal staples of Article III courts are, in es-
sence, incompatible with terrorism-related trials:  the right to confront 
one’s accusers, and the right to a trial by a jury of one’s peers. 
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Others raise similar concerns.  For example, Jack Goldsmith and 
Neal Katyal suggest that criminal prosecutions are “not always feasi-
ble.”  Jack L. Goldsmith & Neal Katyal, Op-Ed., The Terrorists’ Court, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2007, at A19.  For instance, “some alleged terror-
ists have not committed overt crimes and can be tried only on a con-
spiracy theory that comes close to criminalizing group membership.”  
Id.  Also, the standard of proof for evidence collected in Afghanistan 
“might not meet every jot and tittle of American criminal law.”  Id.  
Goldsmith and Katyal argue that instead, Congress should “establish a 
comprehensive system of preventive detention that is overseen by a 
national security court composed of federal judges with life tenure.”  
Id. 
III.  THE SOLUTION:  DOMESTIC TERROR COURTS 
Domestic terror courts address the principal issues associated with 
Article III courts.  By enabling the government to introduce available 
intelligence information, domestic terror courts create a forum for the 
government to present its case in full.  Does this affect the rights of 
the defendant?  In full candor, the answer is yes.  But, the proposed 
court will protect the defendant by ensuring that the court will not 
automatically accept the introduced intelligence into the record.  
That is, the government will have to show that the intelligence infor-
mation is valid, viable, relevant, and corroborated.  Strict scrutiny that bal-
ances the legitimate rights of the individual with the equally legitimate 
national security rights of the state is one of the significant advantages 
of the proposed domestic court. 
Under my proposal, intelligence information would be presented 
in camera by the prosecutor and a representative of the intelligence 
services who would be subject to rigorous cross-examination by the 
court.  The judges who would sit on the domestic terror courts would 
be trained in understanding intelligence information.  In addition, 
the bench would be expected to fulfill a “double role”—that of fact-
finder and defense counsel alike.  As the latter will be barred from at-
tending the hearings when intelligence information is submitted, the 
domestic terror courts would have to proactively engage the prosecutor.  
The burden on the court would be enormously significant because the 
defendant, who would not be present, would not have counsel repre-
senting him with respect to the submission of intelligence information 
into the record. 
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This is a major stumbling block regarding domestic terror courts.  
Based on my experience sitting as a judge in administrative detention 
hearings where the only evidence relevant to the detainee was intelli-
gence information, the burden on the judge is significant.  However, it 
is the only manner in which intelligence information can be submit-
ted.  In analyzing terrorism-related cases, it is critical that the role of 
intelligence information be fully understood:  it is all but impossible to 
conduct a terrorism-related case without it.  That is, without making 
intelligence information available, no court can fully understand or 
appreciate the role a particular defendant has played in a terrorist 
cell.  Without that information, a court cannot understand the inner 
workings of a terrorist cell, its goals, missions, and motivations.  With-
out that information, a court will be, in essence, groping in the dark. 
Some in favor of Article III courts suggest that 
[t]he difficulties involved in using classified evidence in terrorism prose-
cutions do not provide compelling support for an argument that the 
criminal justice system should be abandoned in terrorism cases; these 
difficulties are entirely self-imposed. . . . If the government determines 
that it is more important to national security that a piece of information 
remain secret than to prosecute the terrorist, it can simply choose not to 
use that information or not to charge that terrorist until some unclassi-
fied evidence of his guilt can be presented.  If the government deter-
mines that it is more important to national security to prosecute the ter-
rorist than to keep the information in question secret—perhaps to 
prevent him from carrying out a terrorist attack—it can simply declassify 
the information and use it as evidence against him. 
Michael German, Trying Enemy Combatants in Civilian Courts, 75 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1421, 1426-27 (2007). 
While this argument is true—the government can choose whether 
to prosecute a terrorist based on whether they want to disclose intelli-
gence information—it is inherently limiting.  The government is 
caught in an all-or-nothing situation:  either it keeps intelligence in-
formation secret, or it prosecutes terrorists.  This highlights both the 
importance of intelligence information (essential in order to try ter-
rorists) and the Article III courts’ inability to properly account for its 
importance.  Domestic terror courts, on the other hand, allow the 
government both to maintain the secrecy of intelligence information 
and to try suspected terrorists.  As George Washington wrote in 1777, 
The necessity of procuring good Intelligence, is apparent and need not 
be further urged.  All that remains for me to add is, that you keep the 
whole matter as secret as possible.  For upon secrecy, success depends in 
most Enterprises of the kind, and for want of it, they are generally de-
feated, however well planned and promising a favourable issue. 
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Nathan Alexander Sales, Secrecy and National Security Investigations, 58 ALA. 
L. REV. 811, 811 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
from a Letter from George Washington to Col. Elias Dayton (July 26, 
1777), in 8 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON FROM THE ORIGINAL 
MANUSCRIPT SOURCES, 1745-1799, at 479 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1931)). 
FINAL THOUGHT 
Domestic terror courts are not problem-free—far from it.  How-
ever, the suggested proposal would make it possible to try an individ-
ual suspected of terrorism in a court of law while simultaneously bal-
ancing his legitimate rights with the state’s equally legitimate national 
security rights.  The other available models—Guantanamo Bay, a 
treaty-based international terror court, and Article III courts—would 
not and do not meet this requirement. 
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Guantanamo Bay currently houses 275 people designated as “en-
emy combatants,” many of whom may have engaged in war crimes or 
“terrorist” activities.  Fourteen of these prisoners are “high value de-
tainees” formerly held by the CIA at other locations.  Some of the 
more than 600 people held by U.S. forces at Bagram, Afghanistan—
and perhaps people in other locations as well—may have committed 
similar acts.  Beginning shortly after 9/11, a fierce debate has been 
raging in U.S. legal and policy circles about where to hold these peo-
ple, how to treat them, whether to put them on trial and, if they are to 
be tried, where and for what. 
Professor Guiora’s contribution to this debate ably sets out the 
case for using hybrid courts for trials of suspected terrorists who are 
not U.S. citizens.  He rejects both military commissions and criminal 
trials in Article III courts as unworkable.  A hybrid approach, he sug-
gests, will allow policymakers to pick the best of both models while 
avoiding the vices of each.  We can have the “war on terror” equivalent 
of guns and butter:  criminal trials that will satisfy concerns about clas-
sified information and allow the conviction of terrorists while also re-
specting due process values. 
I will begin my response by considering what is at stake in the con-
troversy over trying suspected terrorists.  Based on that discussion, I 
will suggest that policymakers should choose Article III courts rather 
than hybrid courts for trials of suspected terrorists, with military courts 
as a fall-back option.  I will also suggest that critics of U.S. policy 
should abandon the idea of trials in many cases and instead support a 
straightforward policy of preventive detention combined with contin-
ued transfer of prisoners to other countries. 
I. PRACTICAL ISSUES IN THE TRIAL OF SUSPECTED TERRORISTS 
A number of commentators have advanced proposals for dealing 
with suspected terrorists.  Many reject the idea that Article III courts 
can handle the job, but that rejection comes too easily.  Kelly Moore, 
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the former Chief of the Violent Crimes and Terrorism Section of the 
U.S. Attorney’s Office in the Eastern District of New York, argued in a 
recent article that a proactive investigation and prosecution policy af-
ter the 9/11 attacks resulted in significant intelligence information as 
well as successful prosecutions.  See Kelly Moore, The Role of Federal 
Criminal Prosecutions in the War on Terrorism, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 
837, 847-48 (2007).  Writing in the same issue of the journal, Professor 
Robert Chesney contended that federal prosecution of terrorism of-
fenses should be seen as a “narrative of success.”  Robert M. Chesney, 
Federal Prosecution of Terrorism-Related Offenses:  Conviction and Sentencing 
Data in Light of the “Soft-Sentence” and “Data-Reliability” Critiques, 11 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 851, 889 (2007).  Finally, a September 2007 
A.B.A. Journal article reported that the federal government has won 
thirty-one out of thirty-eight terrorism cases, and some of the cases 
scored as losses still resulted in convictions.  See Edward A. Adams, 31 
Wins, 6 Losses & 1 Tie, A.B.A.J., Sept. 2007, at 24-26. 
In short, the federal government is often able to prosecute sus-
pected terrorists in federal court.  The success of terrorism prosecu-
tions suggests that in many instances proposals for military commis-
sions and hybrid courts are a solution in search of a problem. 
Legitimate issues do exist, however.  Attorney General and former 
federal district court judge Michael Mukasey insists that terrorism 
prosecutions strain resources and “risk disclosure to our enemies of 
methods and sources of intelligence.”  Michael B. Mukasey, Jose Padilla 
Makes Bad Law, WALL ST. J., Aug. 22, 2007, at A15.  Kelly Moore admits 
that applying the rules of evidence to materials obtained in combat 
operations can be difficult, while in a forthcoming Stanford Law Review 
article Professors Chesney and Jack Goldsmith express concerns about 
hearsay and classified information.  See Robert M. Chesney & Jack L. 
Goldsmith, Terrorism and the Convergence of Criminal and Military Deten-
tion Models, 60 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008). 
To the extent that Attorney General Mukasey’s concern about re-
sources is simply an issue of cost, the obvious solution is more re-
sources, including shifting federal resources from areas that state 
prosecutors and courts are competent to handle.  As for concerns 
about evidence, Moore suggests answers to chain of custody and au-
thentication issues.  At least some hearsay concerns are addressed by 
Federal Rule of Evidence 807, which permits introduction of hearsay 
that has “circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness.”  Classified in-
formation is addressed to some extent by the Classified Information 
Procedures Act (CIPA).  Terrorism prosecutions raise difficult CIPA 
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issues, but, as Moore notes, some information can be declassified, 
while Professors Chesney and Goldsmith admit that courts have found 
ways to give information to defendants without compromising na-
tional security.  Some information may be released by mistake, which 
appears to be Attorney General Mukasey’s primary evidentiary con-
cern.  But the mistakes he cites, while serious, have been few and do 
not appear to have caused significant harm.  Thus, unless one believes 
that no mistakes are tolerable in a war on terror, Article III courts are 
more than capable of handling classified information issues. 
Professor Guiora raises some of these concerns, and I suspect he 
will not be satisfied with my handling of them.  He also notes that 
Zacarias Moussaoui turned his trial into a spectacle.  Certainly, high 
profile terrorism trials are likely to be spectacles.  But many “ordinary” 
criminal trials are spectacles (O.J., anyone?), and many terrorism 
prosecutions have ended in plea bargains.  Problems with grandstand-
ing defendants are neither limited to terrorism (remember the Chi-
cago 7 or 8?) nor characteristic of it (José Padilla did not engage in it).  
At the end of the day, courts can address practical issues of the kind 
raised by Professor Guiora and others in the majority of cases.  For 
some terrorism trials judges will have to be more creative than in or-
dinary trials, but I suspect they are up to the task. 
Solutions to these concerns also will not generalize across the 
criminal law in most cases.  That is to say, borrowing from Bill Stuntz, 
many of these solutions are not “transsubstantive.”  William J. Stuntz, 
Local Policing After the Terror, 111 YALE L.J. 2137, 2140 (2002).  At least 
two issues may require solutions that generalize, however.  First, Pro-
fessor Guiora suggests that Confrontation Clause doctrine will impair 
some judicial efforts to allow introduction of probative and reliable 
evidence.  He is correct, unless doctrine changes.  Any change in Con-
frontation Clause doctrine, however—such as a move towards more 
balancing of interests—likely would apply to all criminal trials. 
A second issue—also noted by Professor Guiora—involves the 
definition of criminal offenses.  To the extent that terrorism prosecu-
tions rely on ordinary criminal statutes, such as conspiracy, prosecu-
tors may push for broader definitions of the offense which, if upheld 
by courts, can be applied in other contexts as well.  Thus, while most 
issues surrounding the use of Article III courts are solvable, terrorism 
trials—much like the war on drugs—could produce doctrinal changes 
that many people would find undesirable. 
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II. MILITARY COURTS AND HYBRID TRIALS AS POLICY INSTRUMENTS 
Not all proposals to bypass Article III courts derive from concerns 
about procedure and doctrine.  Avoiding questions about detention 
conditions and interrogation practices appears to be a goal as well, 
though I should note that Professor Guiora explicitly does not rely on 
this goal.  Having chosen a parallel system of detention and interroga-
tion after 9/11, policymakers now face the prospect of revealing de-
tails about their treatment of specific individuals—as happened to 
some extent in the trial of José Padilla.  Some of the claims that courts 
will release too much intelligence information may be a cover for this 
concern as well.  New forums and procedures make it easier to insu-
late investigation practices from public view. 
Similarly, some of the concern about expending resources on ter-
rorism trials in Article III courts comes down to the cost of trial rights.  
Since 9/11, the United States has adopted a policy of capturing terror-
ists, interrogating them, and then detaining them for a very long time.  
Implementing that policy in an effective way requires executive con-
trol.  Courts, defense lawyers, and trial rights make that policy less ef-
fective by raising its cost and introducing risk.  New forums and pro-
cedures, by contrast, will make the policy more efficient. 
The capture-interrogate-detain pipeline also requires public sup-
port, particularly the support of legal, media, and policy elites.  Sup-
port, in turn, derives to a large extent from perceptions of legitimacy.  
Criminal trials can add legitimacy, but they also risk undermining the 
policy by disrupting the pipeline. Policymakers might conclude that 
the obvious solution is enough trial process to add legitimacy, but with 
restrictions that ensure convictions in the vast majority of cases. 
A final reason for concern over criminal trials is the belief that ter-
rorism presents more than an ordinary crime control challenge.  For 
people who hold this view, the “war on terror” is a real war, which 
means that the kinds of responses that sufficed for the “war on drugs” 
do not go far enough.  Ideas of necessity and emergency power play a 
role here, as does the simple assertion that rules of war and military 
institutions should take precedence. 
III. CRIMINAL TRIALS, COURTS-MARTIAL,  
AND PREVENTIVE DETENTION 
Aspects of the war model for responding to terrorism make sense; 
the laws of war should apply when military invasions and occupations 
are involved.  Much of the response to terrorism has little to do with 
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military action, however, and traditional criminal law methods should 
remain the presumptive choice, precisely because they provide famil-
iar restraints on government action.  Mark Tushnet has suggested that 
the kind of permanent emergency presupposed by an open-ended war 
on terror risks “the end of the rule of law itself.”  Mark Tushnet, Emer-
gencies and the Idea of Constitutionalism, in THE CONSTITUTION IN WAR-
TIME:  BEYOND ALARMISM AND COMPLACENCY 39, 45 (Mark Tushnet ed., 
2005).  I would prefer to say that the war model risks changing the way 
the rule of law is produced and maintained, but his basic point holds.  
Creating special courts and procedures for people who could be tried 
in ordinary courts is an unnecessary step in most cases. 
Still, the concern I mentioned about transsubstantive rules should 
give pause.  Broad doctrinal change, or acceleration of change already 
underway, alters the way the rule of law operates.  Or, if doctrine holds 
firm, people may be acquitted and freed despite the fact that they 
pose a risk of criminal behavior.  Requiring criminal trials across the 
board thus may not produce the most desirable set of results. 
As I suggested earlier, one set of transsubstantive concerns derives 
from evidentiary issues, including efforts to admit classified informa-
tion without violating the Confrontation Clause.  When those efforts 
create too much tension with existing doctrine, courts-martial or even 
military commissions might be more appropriate forums if the defen-
dant’s alleged conduct violates the laws of war.  But the decision to use 
military courts should not be reserved for the executive.  Congress 
should provide that charges be filed in federal court, and if the gov-
ernment wishes to move the proceeding to a military court it must 
convince the court that transfer is appropriate.  In addition, any per-
son tried before a military court, whether a court-martial or military 
commission, should be able to appeal any conviction to an Article III 
court.  This structure is better than a hybrid court because it uses two 
institutions—the federal courts and the military justice system—that 
are well established and capable, rather than creating an entirely new 
institution.  Indeed, the problem with the post-9/11 military commis-
sions has been not only that they risk being unfair, but also that they 
have been difficult to create while under the watchful eyes of interest 
groups that are seeking to tug the commissions in conflicting direc-
tions.  I suspect the same issues would plague the domestic terror 
courts that Professor Guiora proposes. 
The other set of transsubstantive concerns applies directly to the 
capture-interrogate-detain pipeline.  The pipeline policy can be one 
component of a larger response to terrorism, so long as officials aban-
don torture and allow meaningful judicial review.  Criminal trials are 
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consistent with this policy to the extent that imprisonment is seen as a 
punitive response to terrorism, and the risk of acquittal in such cases is 
likely to be small.  But, where the goal is preventing future terrorism, 
criminal trials are less likely to be an effective tool.  Indeed, the pre-
ventive goals of the Bush administration’s “war on terror” explain why 
terrorism trials put pressure on the definition of conspiracy:  because 
the aim is to secure and legitimize the detention of people who are 
guilty by association, and thus pose some degree of risk, but who may 
have taken few concrete actions.  Detention, rather than trial, is a rea-
sonable option for people in this category, as Jack Goldsmith and Neal 
Katyal have also suggested, see Jack L. Goldsmith & Neal Katyal, Op-
Ed., The Terrorists’ Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2007, at A19, and it is a 
better option than hybrid courts. 
CONCLUSION 
In sum, Article III courts should be the primary option for non-
citizens whose conduct fits within traditional and reasonable interpre-
tations of federal criminal law.  In some cases, evidentiary or other is-
sues might justify transferring the proceedings to a military court.  For 
people who pose a risk but whose conduct may not violate federal 
criminal law, prolonged preventive detention is the best choice.  Im-
portantly, however, policymakers should be clear about their goals 
and the processes that serve those goals.  Detention is not for everyone 
swept up by U.S. troops or federal agents.  The only people eligible for 
preventive detention should be those who cannot easily be tried in Ar-
ticle III or military courts, and who qualify as prisoners of war or who 
have been found to pose a risk of criminal activity after a hearing.  
These hearings should be consistent with the standards Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld imposed for the detention of citizens, except that the gov-
ernment should bear the burden of proof and prisoners should have 
counsel and an opportunity for meaningful federal court review.  In 
addition, prisoners held in preventive detention should receive peri-
odic assessment of their status and conditions of confinement, fol-
lowed by federal court review. 
I have no illusions that the detention process would be free of er-
ror, and I do not think anyone should pretend that it would be.  A pol-
icy and process of this kind can be legitimate only if officials are trans-
parent about the reasons for its adoption and the kinds of factors that 
are at play, and are also willing to modify those reasons and factors 
when necessary.  Transparency allows federal courts to look over the 
executive’s shoulder and also ensures that Congress and others know 
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how the policy is operating and can make informed choices about 
whether to continue it.  Further, preventive detention should be re-
served for people who really pose a risk; it should not be an excuse to 
warehouse suspicious people.  But unless federal law is going to crimi-
nalize risk, trial in federal court will not be possible for every sus-
pected terrorist who more probably than not poses a risk of violent 
criminal activity. 
Everyone else should be set free, placed into a program of super-
vised release, placed under surveillance, or sent elsewhere.  Indeed, 
one way to address the situation of many of the people in U.S. custody 
is simply to return them to their home countries or extradite them to 
countries interested in prosecuting them.  Here, too, meaningful fed-
eral court review is necessary, including review of the treatment peo-
ple are likely to receive in the other country. 
My proposal is far from perfect.  Indeed, it is arguably a hybrid 
approach as well, because I add detention and military courts to a tra-
ditional criminal justice approach.  Yet to the extent my proposal is a 
hybrid, it is less disruptive than Professor Guiora’s and is therefore, I 
think, worth considering. 
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CLOSING STATEMENT 
Amos N. Guiora 
Professor Parry raises several well-articulated and thoughtful re-
sponses to my domestic terror court proposal.  As a matter of fact, Pro-
fessor Parry all but endorses my hybrid paradigm proposal. 
I. ARTICLE III AND MILITARY COURTS AS “FALL BACKS” 
Professor Parry argues that suspected terrorists should be tried in 
Article III Courts, using military courts as “fall backs,” rather than 
turning to my proposed domestic terror courts.  Professor Parry sug-
gests that Article III courts have been successful with respect to terror-
ism, and that the creation of a hybrid court is a “solution in search of a 
problem.”  However, in the same breath Professor Parry acknowledges 
concerns surrounding both the admission of intelligence information 
into evidence and providing the defendant with the right to confront 
his or her accuser. 
As a solution, Professor Parry suggests that “when those efforts 
create too much tension,” a court-martial or military court may be 
used as a fall back.  That way, two existing institutions—federal courts 
and military courts—can be used in lieu of creating an entirely new 
court. 
To me that sounds strikingly familiar—it is a re-articulated version 
of my proposed domestic terror court.  There is one difference:  
rather than creating a new court, Professor Parry suggests either 
bringing the individual to trial before a military commission or a 
court-martial. 
Neither proposition is satisfactory or appropriate.  Courts-martial 
are for soldiers; military commissions, as established by the Bush ad-
ministration in the aftermath of 9/11, do not afford the necessary due 
process.  Their legitimacy was effectively destroyed when Brigadier 
General Hartmann testified that information received from an indi-
vidual subjected to waterboarding could be introduced in a military 
commission trial.  Professor Parry correctly states that my proposal 
does not seek to insulate investigation practices.  Quite the opposite—
my proposal aims to protect the individual both during investigation 
and trial.  In addition, it seeks to balance that interest with the state’s 
need to bring forth information that otherwise could not be intro-
duced. 
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However, unlike Professor Parry’s proposal, my proposal seeks to 
do this balancing in a civil context, rather than a military one.  By rely-
ing on civilian judges instead of military judges, my proposal ensures 
that the defendant will be brought to trial before an independent trier 
of fact.  Professor Parry’s suggestion that the suspect be brought be-
fore a military trier of fact is but the militarization of my proposal.  His 
proposal keeps the process “all in the family”—the executive detains, 
interrogates, and prosecutes.  Does it also sit on appeal?  Either way, 
justice is neither served nor rendered. 
II. THE SPECTACLE CONTINUES:  EVIDENTIARY CONCERNS 
Professor Parry acknowledges concerns about introducing intelli-
gence information into evidence.  He seeks to allay those concerns by 
pointing to the Confidential Information Procedures Act.  Unques-
tionably, terrorism prosecutions raise difficult evidentiary issues.  But 
why suggest that resolution is best accomplished only by declassifying 
information or somehow “giv[ing] information to defendants without 
compromising national security”?  Why even travel that route?  Why 
declassify vital intelligence information?  Why run the risk of making a 
mistake when domestic terror courts would allow for in camera pres-
entation of intelligence information? 
In my proposed domestic terror court, unlike traditional Article 
III courts, if there is a need to introduce classified information, the 
court would review the intelligence information and rigorously ques-
tion either the source or the state representative regarding reliability 
and corroboration.  The information would assist the court in deter-
mining the defendant’s guilt or innocence.  However, a conviction 
could not be based solely on classified information and the court 
would be required to state that its decision to convict was primarily 
(i.e., more than 50%) based on evidence submitted to the court, 
thereby preserving the defendant’s right to confront his accuser. 
If convicted, the defendant could appeal to the U.S. Supreme 
Court regarding conviction and/or the severity of punishment.  That 
is the essence of an independent judiciary.  Professor Parry’s reliance 
on a “military only” process is the very antithesis of the independent 
judiciary so critical to the paradigm I propose. 
Professor Parry correctly highlights my deep concern regarding 
spectacles in terror cases.  Zacarias Moussaoui is the poster child for 
such concerns and spectacles.  Such spectacles also occur—Professor 
Parry reminds us of the O.J. Simpson trial—in nonterror cases.  My re-
sponse?  Exactly.  Remember the O.J. Simpson trial?  Is that how we 
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want to try terrorists?  Is that the process we want for individuals who 
commit heinous acts of terrorism, attacking and killing innocent civil-
ians?  Is that the dignity the process deserves?  Clearly, Article III 
courts are not the forum to try high-profile terrorism cases. 
III. PREVENTIVE DETENTION 
Professor Parry additionally suggests that in order to prevent fu-
ture acts of terrorism, preventive detention is a “reasonable option” 
for people who pose a “risk”—people who are guilty by association—
but who have not broken any federal criminal law.  This is but a re-
articulation of the two-tiered judicial model Israel has developed and 
implemented over the past few decades.  In this problematic para-
digm, an individual is not brought to trial.  Rather, he is administra-
tively detained based on reliable, corroborated classified information 
suggesting his involvement in future acts of terrorism.  I have exten-
sive professional experience—as prosecutor, judge and legal advisor—
with the administrative detention process.  That experience leads me 
to one unequivocal conclusion:  the process must be, if at all possible, 
avoided. 
Under the Israeli paradigm, an individual is administratively de-
tained if the sole basis for his detention is intelligence information.  In 
other words, there is no criminal evidence.  The proposed hybrid 
paradigm resolves that tension by enabling the state to bring such an 
individual to trial, provided criminal evidence also exists.  That course 
of action is far preferable to administrative process. 
FINAL THOUGHT 
Professor Parry prefers an Article III process to a hybrid one.  Or 
does he?  Is not the fall-back position he articulates nothing but a re-
cantation of the domestic court I recommend?  It appears to me that it 
is, but with one major difference.  Rather than establish domestic ter-
ror courts, Professor Parry recommends falling back on military courts 
with no independent judicial review.  Regarding the possibility of 
spectacles—an issue of great concern to me—Professor Parry san-
guinely reminds us of O.J.  To that I reply, terrorism and the justice it 
demands are too important for show. 
These cases require sobriety and seriousness.  They also frequently 
require the introduction—unfortunately—of classified information.  
The domestic terror court paradigm I propose addresses all these is-
sues.  Is it perfect?  No.  Does the present system require renovation?  
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Yes.  Do we require a judicial system specifically for terrorism?  Yes.  Is 
terrorism going away?  No.  Therefore, we need to—quickly—adopt 
the domestic terror court paradigm.  Justice must be both rendered 
and seen.  Judicial independence is critical to the process.  Civilian, 
not military, courts are the appropriate route.  My proposal is not 
“problem seeking,” it is “problem solving”! 
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CLOSING STATEMENT 
John T. Parry 
According to Professor Guiora, the United States and those acting 
on its behalf hold as many as 25,000 people suspected of involvement 
in activities defined in some way as “terrorist.”  Our debate is about 
what to do with these people.  Professor Guiora argues that hybrid 
courts are the best option.  I agree that some innovation is warranted 
given the situation in which we find ourselves.  That is to say, neither 
Professor Guiora nor I can do much about the often misguided policy 
choices that have produced the situation we both are trying to ad-
dress. 
Nonetheless, our proposals, both in the ways they overlap and in 
the ways they differ, offer more than ideas for getting out of a bad 
situation.  They also reflect our views on those policy choices and the 
concerns that drove them.  Professor Guiora, I think, is searching for a 
new set of structures to address what he sees as a new situation or chal-
lenge, one that does not fit into familiar criminal law or war models 
for deploying and restraining state violence.  I am less convinced that 
the situation is so new or that new approaches are necessary.  As a re-
sult, I would prefer to use traditional models as much as possible and 
to innovate only around the edges.  In particular, I would rely as much 
as possible on criminal trials in Article III courts and save hybrid ap-
proaches for relatively rare cases.  I worry that departing from familiar 
legal processes, and in particular creating hybrid courts of the kind 
Professor Guiora proposes, inevitably will bring too much of the war 
model into the mix. 
Thus, although my version of a hybrid approach would mix crimi-
nal trials in Article III courts with military proceedings and preventive 
detention for some of the people currently in custody, my strong pref-
erence is for putting suspects on trial in Article III courts or releasing 
them (perhaps with conditions, monitoring, or surveillance).  I am far 
less enthusiastic about military courts and detention.  I include mili-
tary courts in my proposal because I take seriously the concerns that 
Professor Guiora and others raise about Article III criminal trials.  I 
include preventive detention because I take seriously the claims of 
government officials and policy makers that large numbers of people, 
including many of the people currently in detention, pose a serious 
risk of engaging in terrorist activities.  It follows, for me, that military 
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courts and preventive detention should be available when those con-
cerns and claims bear fruit; they should not be automatic or easy 
choices.  That is why prosecutors should have to obtain permission 
from an Article III court to transfer a case to a military proceeding.  
Likewise, no one should be held in preventive detention without a real 
hearing at which the government bears the burden of proof, the pris-
oner has counsel, and appeal to a federal court is available.  Indeed, I 
would not object to having the initial hearing itself in federal court.  
Meaningful periodic review that either takes place in federal court or 
is reviewable by federal courts should also be a requirement. 
In his efforts to demonstrate that a hybrid domestic terror court 
provides a better way, Professor Guiora offers a series of criticisms to 
which I will attempt to respond.  First, he seizes on my willingness to 
accept military courts and reiterates his claim that they are not a viable 
option.  Again, I envision the use of military courts in rare cases, sub-
ject only to federal court approval and with full appeal rights to fed-
eral courts.  Further, my goal was not to endorse the current military 
commission process that Congress approved in a rush following the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, although it is cer-
tainly better than the previous version cooked up by the Bush admini-
stration alone.  Nor do I think much of Brigadier General Hartmann’s 
suggestion that information obtained by waterboarding could be ad-
missible in a military commission proceeding.  Military commissions 
should not be kangaroo courts. 
Professor Guiora may be correct that any form of military commis-
sion will lack legitimacy.  The Bush administration has made them an 
integral part of the capture-interrogate-detain pipeline, where both 
interrogation and detention are harsh and arbitrary at best, and where 
military commissions serve—or appear to serve—a legitimizing func-
tion rather than a checking function.  Put more bluntly, in their cur-
rent form and in the context of current policy, military commissions 
are a Potemkin village of process.  A rational and effective policy for 
dealing with large numbers of suspected terrorists could employ mili-
tary commissions, which is why they are part of my proposal, but that 
function may no longer be possible.  Similarly, any other kind of mili-
tary process may be equally as tainted. 
Professor Guiora next raises the issue of classified information and 
suggests there is no need to risk disclosure of sensitive information 
because hybrid courts will provide a secure forum.  The classified in-
formation concern is probably the most significant practical issue in 
the debate over bypassing Article III courts.  And I should make clear 
my two-fold bias on this issue.  First, I tend to believe that much classi-
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fied information is simply not as sensitive as government officials 
claim, particularly not by the time it might be introduced into evi-
dence at a criminal trial, which could be years after it was gathered.  
Second, I also suspect that reasonable people can resolve issues about 
classified information in a variety of ways, such as in camera hearings 
about admissibility and protection of information, the use of summa-
ries and limited access, and even partial declassification.  Compro-
mises sometimes fail or fall apart, and people sometimes make mis-
takes, but those are not sufficient reasons, in my view, to abandon the 
Article III process entirely. 
The next issue is spectacle.  Here my claims are simple.  I am not 
overly concerned about the dignity of the process so long as it is rea-
sonably orderly and allows the presentation of issues and evidence in 
ways that assist fact-finders.  If those things sometimes happen in an 
atmosphere of spectacle, so what?  After all, the idea of the spectacular 
trial goes well beyond the often controllable shenanigans of criminal 
defendants.  Nor are they simply “show” trials, as Professor Guiora 
suggests.  To the contrary, Martha Umphrey has observed that spec-
tacular trials mediate between formal and informal sources of law by 
providing “potential material for the articulation and elaboration of 
legal principle and procedure” and serving as “cultural texts for public 
consumption.”  Martha Merrill Umphrey, The Dialogics of Legal Mean-
ing:  Spectacular Trials, the Unwritten Law, and Narratives of Criminal Re-
sponsibility, 33 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 393, 419-20 (1999).  While that dy-
namic may not always be positive, defenders of transparency, 
democracy, and open societies can find a lot to like in the spectacle of 
the trial, even when it gets messy.  When you hang your laundry out in 
public, people get to know a lot about you, both good and bad—but 
maybe that is the point. 
Finally, Professor Guiora draws on his experience in Israel to re-
ject the idea of preventive detention through administrative process.  I 
agree we should avoid detention as a wholesale response to terrorism 
or consequence of counter-terrorist activities.  I also agree that deten-
tion resulting from an administrative process is not ideal.  That is why 
I want federal courts to be part of the process at least at the appeal 
stage, if not before, and why I would also make them part of a periodic 
review process.  I would also urge policymakers to go a step further 
and place limits on the maximum amount of time a person may be de-
tained.  Detention for the duration of the “war on terror” is effectively 
a life sentence, and I do not support that kind of detention in the ab-
sence of a criminal conviction.  Holding a person for a maximum of, 
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say, five years in decent conditions, by contrast, achieves protection 
against risk without destroying due process values.  In other words, it 
strikes me as potentially a reasonable balance, which is what due proc-
ess doctrine is all about (for better and for worse). 
Although Professor Guiora objects to detention, his proposal is 
not very clear on the amount of time and money it would take to con-
duct domestic terror court trials of 25,000 people, not to mention 
what we do with them pending trial.  Detention proceedings are likely 
to be less costly.  The cost of holding people in a time-limited deten-
tion is also likely to be lower than imprisoning terror court convicts 
who presumably would receive long sentences.  My point is not that 
cost and efficiency must carry the day—in my initial contribution I 
said they should not—but rather that they remain important factors. 
The willingness to innovate and adopt hybrid approaches is admi-
rable and important.  In the context of trying suspected terrorists, 
however, I fear that Professor Guiora’s solution raises more concerns 
than the problems he is trying to address.  For that reason above all 
others, I prefer traditional approaches.  If we are to make mistakes or 
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